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THE COLOR LINE OF PUNISHMENT 
Jerome H. Skolnick* 
RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAW. By Randall Kennedy. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 1997. Pp. 538. $30. 
If "the color line," (in W.E.B. Du Bois's 1903 phrase and proph­
ecy)1 was to be the twentieth century's greatest challenge for the 
domestic life and public policy of the United States, the law has had 
much to do with drawing its shape. No surprise, this. By now, legal 
theorists accept that law does not advance in preordained fashion, 
immune from the sway of political interest, belief systems and social 
structure. Still, it is hard to exaggerate how powerfully the law has 
shaped the life chances of Americans of African heritage, for good 
or ill, and in ways that we scarcely think of today. 
The act of interracial marrying, for example, does not today 
evoke visions of criminality, although it once did. Thirty-nine states 
- including states in the North and West - had at one time passed 
laws forbidding intermarriage between persons of different race.2 
Many of these laws were still in effect following World War II.3 If a 
black man had married a white woman in Virginia in 1966 the mar­
riage would have been void ab initio, and they would each have 
been guilty of a felony. Loving v. Virginia, 4 the 1967 case that freed 
interracial couples to marry, is only a footnote in Randall Ken­
nedy's Race, Crime and the Law, but that is understandable. 
The anti-miscegenation laws arose out of racial theories assert­
ing that the children of "mixed" marriages would be defective. In 
one respect, these laws were often breached in practice. Black 
women were taken or raped regularly by white men who were 
rarely, if ever, punished (p. 35). Such children were sired in un­
counted numbers, and then denoted as "Negro." The laws 
criminalizing intermarriage thus delegitimatized the offspring of re­
lations between white men and black women so that they could not 
* Claire Clements Dean's Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley. 
B.B.A. 1952, City College of New York; M.A. 1953, Ph.D. 1957, Yale. - Ed. A version of 
this book review also appears in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, July-Aug. 1998, at 90-95. 
1. W.E.B. Du Bors, THE Sour.s OF BLACK FOLK 35 (Frrst Vrntage Books 1990) (1903). 
2. See FOWLER V. HARPER & JEROME H. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF 11lE FAMILY 96-99 
(rev. ed. 1962). 
3. For example, California's law forbidding most interracial marriage was in effect until 
1948, when it was invalidated by the Supreme Court of California. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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inherit their father's property. In another respect, the laws were 
rigorously enforced to prevent black men from having consensual 
sex with white women under any circumstances, including marriage. 
These laws implied that no rational, adult, white woman would 
agree to have sex with a black man. Any breaking of the sex-color 
line taboo between a black man and a white woman could be -
and in the peculiar logic of the deep South should be - considered 
the moral equivalent of rape, even if blessed by the sacrament of 
marriage. 
In the context of such racial theorizing, accusations of rape 
against black men made by white women were rarely disbelieved. 
Stich accusations were likely to draw the unbridled viciousness of 
white vigilantes, who remained unpunished for the crimes they 
committed while carrying out lynchings - which often included 
whipping, torturing, burning, and eventu�y hanging the victim -
the "strange fruit" of Lillian Smith's acclaimed novel.5 Southern 
court records show that when a black man was accused of murder­
ing a white man, he was usually not lynched, but was given a trial 
and, if found guilty, capitally punished.6 The accusation of rape, by 
contrast, was more likely to evoke the hot-blooded savagery of a 
lynching. 
The institutions of southern justice - police and courts - typi­
cally ignored the crimes committed by those participating in the 
lynching. Southern blacks passed around stories, which became 
legends, about sex, terror, and the meaninglessness of the official 
legal order. Lynching maintained the caste superiority of whites 
and the bloody etiquette of cross-racial sex, and it undermined any 
trust Americans of African descent might have had in the legal or­
der. "Nothing has more nourished dreams of racial revenge," Ran­
dall Kennedy, a former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall and 
a Professor at Harvard Law School, writes, "than the knowledge 
that buried in American history are scores of black victims of lynch­
ing whose murderers, though known, escaped punishment" (p. 49). 
No RAcE-BAsEo LAw ENFORCEMENT 
This ignominious history of legal theory and practice is a neces­
sary preamble to any understanding of race and crime in America 
today. For this reason, one has to wonder whether America is now 
ready for the message throughout Randall Kennedy's recent book 
Race, Crime, and the Law - that in enforcing the criminal laws, the 
courts and the police should never base their judgments and actions 
on race. 
5. LILLIAN SMITH, STRANGE FRUIT (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992) (1944). 
6. See E.M. Beck et al., The Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: Lethal Sanctioning of Blacks 
in Nonh Carolina and Georgia, 1882 to 1930, 23 L. & SoCY. REv. 317, 329 (1989). 
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Kennedy's position is scarcely that of a reflexive radical on the 
complex and polarizing issue of contemporary race and crime. He 
discusses and deplores how African Americans are doubly victim­
ized by crime and argues that "the principal injury suffered by Afri­
can Americans in relation to criminal matters is not 
overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws."7 Randall 
Kennedy, like Jesse Jackson, recognizes that disproportionate black 
criminality leads to understandable fears among potential victims, 
whether black or white. And like his mentor, Justice Marshall, he 
does not excuse "thuggery" when perpetrated by blacks. Ken­
nedy's fair-mindedness concerning race and crime is further illus­
trated when, in discussing the now-mythic beating of Rodney King, 
a black victim of white police, Kennedy points out that the case was 
· more complicated than is generally acknowledged by those familiar 
only with the portion of the videotape shown on television. At the 
Simi Valley trial, defense attorneys focussed the jury's attention on 
King's behavior leading to the beating. He was, after all, drunk, 
driving at high speed, and resisting arrest. Some use of escalated 
force was probably justified against him, although not the fifty-six 
powerful blows that were actually inflicted. At the Simi Valley trial, 
Kennedy reminds us, defense attorneys were able to point to sub­
tleties that clouded the issue of whether the police harbored racist 
intent. 
Kennedy unfolds his thesis - that the courts and the police 
should never base their judgments and actions on race - in discus­
sions of five major issues: (1) the use of race as an indicator of 
suspiciousness; (2) the use of race-based peremptory challenges; (3) 
7. P. 19. Homicide victimization rates for black males and females continue to be higher 
than for other segments of the population. Black males were 8 to 9 times more likely than 
white males to have committed a homicide during 1996; most of these homicides were in· 
traracial. In 1996, about 9 out of every 10 murders involved victims and offenders of the 
same race when the race of the offender was known. See James Alan Fox, Trends in Juvenile 
Violence: 1997 Update (November 1997) (available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ab· 
stract/tjrfox.htm>. Thus, as overall crime rates decline, so does crime committed by and 
against blacks. 
Overall, violent crime dropped in 1996 in the United States to levels not seen since 1973. 
BUREAU OF JusnCE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Criminal Victimization, 1996: 
Changes 1995-96 With Trends, available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj-gov/bjs/abstract/cv1996. 
htm>. New York City's remarkable crime decline has received the most publicity, and de· 
servedly so. In 1990, New York City experienced 2,245 homicides. That figure dropped re· 
markably in 1996 to 983 homicides. The year 1997 saw yet another drop to 770. In the first 
three months of 1997, 281 homicides occurred. In the first three months of 1998, only 141 
homicides have been reported. Interview with Michael Farrell, Deputy Commissioner for 
Policy and Planning, New York City Police Department (April 2, 1998). In fact, crime is 
dropping all over the United States, from Los Angeles to Cleveland, to Boston, even to 
Washington, D.C. The F.B.I. reported that the homicide rate fell 9 percent in 1996. Federal 
Bureau oflnvestigation Press Release, October 4, 1997. As crime declines generally, so does 
the level of black criminality. This may help to undermine fears of crime committed by 
young black males, who are responsible for most of the crime by blacks. 
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the death penalty; (4) race-based jury nullification; and (5) race­
based disparity in punishment. 
THE PROPRIETY OF RACE As AN INDICATION OF SUSPICIOUSNESS 
Kennedy devotes a significant portion of his book to a related 
issue, but one more subtle than police brutality. "By too easily per­
mitting the police to use race as an indicia of suspiciousness," he 
writes, "courts also derogate from the idea that individuals should 
be judged on the basis of their own, particular c_onduct and not on 
the basis - not even partly on the basis ....:..:. of raCial generaliza­
tions" (p. 157). He asserts that it is never appropriate for police to 
use color as a proxy for criminality. Kennedy does, however, distin­
guish between cases where police act on the basis of a detailed de­
scription as opposed to "the use of racial categories as a 
probabilistic sorting device . . .  to demarcate groups of persons who, 
because of their race, are viewed as more risky than other persons" 
(p. 137 n.*). 
He recognizes that race can signal heightened criminality, just as 
it can indicate other "sociological facts," for instance, greater risk of 
early mortality, fewer employment opportunities, lower income and 
substandard housing. But such "sociological facts" do not, he says, 
"mean that the legal system ought to permit police to engage rou­
tinely in racial discrimination" (p. 145). 
Kennedy points to a number of state and federal cases where 
courts have permitted police to stop and question someone who is 
"out of place": in a white neighborhood, as part of a drug courier 
profile, or in border checkpoints to subject the driver to questioning 
or search.8 Kennedy deplores the legal doctrines permitting police 
to equate blackness with increased risk of criminality because of the 
distrust, anger and discord they generate. 
What are the probabilities of black violence? "It is beyond fool­
ishness to regard American violence as solely, or mainly, or even 
distinctively a black problem," write Franklin Zimring and Gordon 
Hawkins.9 In part, they say, this is because American blacks tend 
to reside in places where social conditions precipitate the greatest 
violence by all races and partly because tendencies to lethal vio­
lence seem to be endemic to the United States.10 Nevertheless, in 
statistics generated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in connection 
8. See State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 
391 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976). 
9. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoRDON HAWKINS, CRIME 1s NoT THE PROBLEM 79 (1997). 
10. See id. 
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with the President's Initiative on Race11 we find that crime is dis­
proportionately a black problem. Although most victims of violent 
crime are white (seventy-five percent in 1995), blacks are victimized 
at higher rates than whites. Blacks have higher arrest rates for vio­
lent crime than other segments of the population, although most 
persons (fifty-four percent) arrested for violent crime in 1995 were 
white. Moreover, despite recent declines, both homicide victimiza­
tion and commission rates continue to be higher for blacks than for 
other segments of the population. At each age, black males are 
about.eight to nine times more likely than white males to have com­
mitted a homicide during 1996.12 
If that is so, it raises a troublesome question: Is it necessarily 
wrong for police to be color conscious? We rely on police to be 
sensitive to subtle cues in their visual world. In my observations of 
police in the early 1960's, I developed the concept of the "symbolic 
assailant," that is, "persons who use gesture, language, and attire 
that the policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to vio­
lence."13 More generally, police who are patrolling an area are sup­
posed to develop a conception of the normal. They are supposed to 
understand who belongs there and which buildings generally have 
lights on in the darkest hours of the early morning. They are sup­
posed to notice an older man parked in front of an elementary 
school. Is he a grandfather picking up a grandchild or a sexual 
predator? Kennedy would argue that such observations are legiti­
mate. But suppose a police officer sees two black teenagers walk­
ing in a white neighborhood at two o'clock in the morning? In a 
society where the residential color line has so often been drawn, 
should we ask police to ignore the race of the teenagers? And if we 
did, would they? 
Even if courts were to forbid police from noticing race, can 
courts actually affect police conduct in this delicate area? Will po­
lice simply not list race when it actually was a factor in stopping and 
questioning someone who fits a profile or appears suspicious to the 
police even if legal doctrine says they may not? Consider the fol­
lowing case. A police detective sees two men, Chilton and Terry, 
"casing" a jewelry store. Lawyers familiar with the landmark 1968 
case of Terry v. Ohio14 know the rest of the story. The officer ques­
tions the men, decides that a crime is afoot, proceeds to pat them 
down, discovers guns and arrests them, along with a third man. 
11. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, "Question and Answer" document 
specially prepared for the President's Initiative on Race (November 17, 1997). 
12. Id. 
13. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 44 (3rd ed. Macmillan Press 1994) 
(1966). 
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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Detective Martin McFadden testifies that he had been patrolling in 
plainclothes at two-thirty in the afternoon, in an area of downtown 
Cleveland that he had been patrolling for thirty years. He says he 
saw something odd about these men. "Now, in this case when I 
looked over they didn't look right to me at the time."15 
The Warren court, while understanding that McFadden had less 
than probable cause to conduct his search, deferred to the practical 
needs of policing and permitted the limited pat-down search of 
Chilton and Terry and the seizure of their weapons, a major doctri­
nal shift in the law governing when police can lawfully stop and 
frisk suspects. Not mentioned in the Supreme Court decision is that 
the suspects were in fact black teenagers, as the N.A.A.C.P. Legal 
Defense Fund brief16 pointed out at the time. But was McFadden 
necessarily a racist? After all, Terry and Chilton were behaving sus­
piciously, they turned out to be armed and evidently were about to 
commit a crime. Yet is it credible that McFadden took no notice of 
their skin color but simply their behavior as part of what made 
them not "look right" to him at the time? More troubling, is it 
possible for a police officer not to factor skin color into his or her 
perceptions of not "looking right" in a society where skin color is so 
salient? 
These are unsettling questions, especially for those like Ken­
nedy - and me - who would prefer to erase skin color as a legiti­
mate indicator of anything. As normative aspirations go, 
Kennedy's desire to eliminate race as an indicator of suspiciousness 
is commendable. It is a standard to which we and the courts should 
aspire. But I expect that in the real world of social and color strati­
fication, disproportionate black criminality, and racism, it is inevita­
ble that police will continue to use race as an indicator, as 
McFadden must surely have done. And like McFadden, especially 
if courts say that police cannot use race as an indicator, they won't 
report that they did, and will testify that what they saw was solely 
odd behavior. 
RACE AND THE JURY 
Kennedy's insistence that skin color be irrelevant in the process­
ing of those accused of crime extends as well to jury selection. Not 
until 1986 did the Supreme Court hold that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to 
exclude blacks from juries. Since then it has outlawed racially­
based peremptory challenges for the defense as well.17 Judges can 
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. 
16. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, & 67). 
17. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
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exercise more authority over attorneys in a courtroom than they 
can over police on the street. Kennedy is skeptical that courts can 
actually prevent prosecutors or defense attorneys from using per­
emptory challenges to shape the racial composition of the jury. 
Like Justice Marshall, he favors eliminating these challenges alto­
gether, arguing that it is probably the only way to restrain attorneys 
who use race as a criterion in jury selection (p. 229). 
THE DEATH PENALTY 
Other components of the criminal justice system are more ame­
nable to doctrinal authority. The Supreme Court could, if it chose, 
abolish the death penalty, but the present conservative court is not 
about to do so. Kennedy is masterful in describing the doctrinal 
zigs and zags of death penalty jurisprudence, and offers an espe­
cially careful and knowledgeable analysis of the statistical data on 
race and execution. 
In the most recent major Supreme Court case, McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 18 the defense introduced a study showing that when victims 
were white in Georgia, perpetrators were four times more likely to 
be condemned to death than when victims were black. The Court 
conceded that the system was skewed against blacks who murdered 
whites, and against black victims, but held that the question was 
whether officials had discriminated against McCleskey in this case, 
not systemically. The Court ruled that they had not. As Kennedy 
recognizes, it would be a gruesome kind of affirmative action that 
sought to reduce racial discrepancies in capital punishment by "lev­
eling up" and executing more blacks who murder black victims (p. 
344). 
Kennedy's discussion of racial fairness in the administration of 
the death penalty is careful, knowledgeable and nuanced, but his 
own position on the larger question - support or opposition to the 
death penalty - is relegated to a footnote (p. 345 n. *). I thought 
this a mistake, since what he says makes much sense, and deserves 
the kind of careful elaboration he gives to the question of racial 
fairness. Kennedy doesn't regard capital punishment as "unconsti­
tutional per se;" but opposes it partly because he fears mistakes and 
partly because he deplores "the lethal, collective, bureaucratic an­
ger that the state displays when it puts a person to death" (p. 345). 
But something else is hinted at in the footnote, a change of 
heart from fervent abolitionist to mild opponent. Kennedy writes 
that when he clerked for Justice Marshall he was forced into 
"[c]onstantly reading about the horrible crimes perpetrated by mur­
derers sentenced to death" (p. 345). Evidently, the brutality of the 
18. 481 U.S. 279 {1987). 
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murderers and the pain of the victims cooled his abolitionist fervor. 
It is not easy to develop a purely rational position on capital punish­
ment, although Justice Blackmun's argument - that the death pen­
alty cannot be administered fairly - comes closest. 
JURY NULLIFICATION 
Punishment is altogether a difficult issue, especially when one 
can predict that a particular race or class will be disproportionately 
represented in the punishment apparatus. Some African-American 
legal scholars, notably Paul Butler in the Yale .Law Journal, have 
advocated that black jurors nullify the eVidence in cases where the 
black defendants are charged with what he describes as "nonvio­
lent, malum prohibitum offenses, including victimless crimes like 
narcotics offenses."19 
Kennedy will have none of this. Agreeing that African Ameri­
cans have often been treated unjustly in the system of criminal jus­
tice, he rebuts Butler point by point, arguing that Butler bases his 
position on a one-dimensional vision. Yes, Kennedy acknowledges, 
the prosecution of the Scottsboro boys20 was "horrible, [and] ra­
cially motivated," but both state and federal authorities intervened 
"in an extraordinary fashion" ultimately preventing their execution 
(p. 300). Similarly, Rodney King's victimization was later followed 
by the imprisonment of the perpetrators of the brutality after a fed­
eral civil rights prosecution. That aside, Kennedy avers, jury nullifi­
catjon will scarcely advance the cause of broad social reform that 
Butler advocates. Those who engage in nullification will have to 
say that they ignored the evidence for a larger cause, and few jurors 
are willing to do that. The jurors in the O.J. Simpson case, for ex­
ample, did not admit to nullification of the evidence although one 
of the black members of the jury reportedly stated after the verdict, 
"We've got to protect our own" (p. 310 n.t). 
DRUG PENALTIES 
Nevertheless, major scholars have argued that the criminal jus­
tice system, particularly the Draconian sentences given to black 
drug offenders, are needlessly and unfairly harsh.21 Part of the dif­
ficulty may arise from our lack of a traditional moral sense about 
the dangers of drug use and sale. We commonly share an aversion 
to murder, armed robbery and burglary, and regard these as serious 
19. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995); p. 296 (quoting Butler). 
20. See Weems v. Alabama, 141 So. 215 (Ala. 1932) for the Scottsboro Boys' appeal to the 
Alabama Supreme Court for their rape conviction. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
the Supreme Court held that the defendants had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 
21. See MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 188-90 (1995). 
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crimes deserving punishment. Moreover, one doesn't have to be a 
law professor steeped in penal codes to understand - and approve 
- that intentional murder deserves the highest punishment the law 
can inflict, with armed robbery and burglary following in an ordinal 
sequence. 
Our intuitions with respect to drug penalties are much less clear. 
What is the just desert for selling a few marihuana cigarettes? How 
about five or five hundred grams of cocaine? Should sale of crack 
be penalized differentially? Criminologists, including yours truly, 
have written and testified against the mammoth penalties for sale 
and use of drugs spurred by the war on drugs, and especially against 
its Draconian consequences for black youth who sell small amounts 
on the street. 22 
The most extreme example of a law discriminating against Afri­
can-American males is the federal law which penalizes those who 
sell 500 grams of cocaine powder, an amount larger than what most 
street dealers possess, with a minimum of five years imprisonment. 
Yet a person selling five grams of crack cocaine, a relatively trifling 
amount, is also subject to a five-year minimum penalty.23 The color 
line is drawn sharply here. In 1993, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
issued a report showing that the average sentence served by black 
prisoners in Federal prison (seventy-one months) was forty-one 
percent longer than the average served by whites (fifty months), 
while in the early 1980s the average time served by blacks was com­
parable to that of whites.24 Th.is did not happen because federal 
judges had turned into racists. The overriding reason was the 100:1 
rule in the federal sentencing statute enacted by Congress in 1986, 
along with stiffer mandatory minimums for violent and gun 
crimes.25 
Th.is is not to say there is no difference between crack and pow­
der cocaine; crack cocaine is powder cocaine dissolved in water, 
with baking soda added, then heated, then dried into hard, smoka­
ble pellets. In effect, if someone has cocaine, with little knowledge 
or effort they can easily create crack. Street samples of crack, for 
example, range from ten percent to forty percent cocaine by weight. 
Although cocaine and crack are not identical, they are not so differ­
ent pharmacologically as to justify vast differences in punishment. 
So the structure of the current guidelines is equivalent, if eggs were 
22. No one has been more critical or effective than Michael Tonry. See id. 
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2Dl.1 (1995) (discussing the 100:1 
rule). 
24. DouGLAs C. McDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEPT. OF Jus11CE, SEN­
TENCING IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS: DoES RACE MA'ITER? 38, 42 tbl.3.4 (1993). 
25. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 6371 
(1988). 
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illegal, to punishing the possession of omelets at 100 times the pos­
session of raw eggs. 
Two other big differences distinguish powder from crack co­
caine. Powder cocaine is more likely to be sold in larger, more ex­
pensive amounts behind tightly closed doors. It is consequently 
harder to catch those who sell it than those who sell crack, sold 
mostly in crack houses or apartments known to neighbors and the 
police, or in the streets. Powder cocaine is the drug of the affluent, 
while crack is the drug of the poor. And because it is sold more 
openly, it is more threatening to community safety and cohesion. It 
is this feature of crack that has led many African-American politi­
cians, and Randall Kennedy, to be more sympathetic to the distinc­
tion in penalties. "Surely," Kennedy writes, "it would be just and 
sensible for a government to punish more severely a person know­
ingly distributing a poison in a low-priced (say five-dollar) 
container as opposed to a high-priced (say fifty-dollar) container 
even if the poison in the two containers was otherwise identical" (p. 
383). 
But John P. Morgan and Lynne Zimmer, who carefully ex­
amined the evidence on the supposedly different effects of crack 
and powder cocaine, conclude that data from the National Institute 
of Drug Abuse show "that relatively few cocaine users actually be­
come 'dependent' - whatever their route of administration - but 
that smoking cocaine by itself does not increase markedly the likeli­
hood of dependence."26 They recognize that smoking cocaine pro­
duces a shorter and more intense high than nasal insufflation of 
cocaine in powder form. They argue further that crack has been 
made available to those parts of the population who are most vul­
nerable to the abuse of drugs. 
But why should we legislate more severe punishment for per­
sons selling the five-dollar containers to low-income street buyers if 
we learned that the sellers were themselves young, black, and poor, 
while the more affluent fifty-dollar sellers could afford to deal be­
hind closed doors where they can cut up the powder into five-dollar 
containers to be sold to the street sellers? Why should we punish 
retailers more than wholesalers? After all, we demand capital pun­
ishment for large-scale cocaine traffickers. Moreover, one could ar­
gue, as Tonry does, that "the architects of the War on Drugs should 
be held morally accountable for the havoc they have wrought 
among disadvantaged members of minority groups. "27 
26. John P. Morgan & Lynne Zimmer, The Social Pharmacology of Smokable Cocaine, in 
CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SocIAL JUSTICE 144 (Craig Reinennan & Harry 
G. Levine eds., 1997). 
27. ToNRY, supra note 21, at 104. 
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At the conclusion of the book, in the very last paragraph, Ken­
nedy backs off. He says he doesn't endorse the crack-powder dif­
ferential. "Even if these policies are misguided," he concludes, 
"being mistaken is different from being racist, and the difference is 
one that greatly matters" (p. 386). Does Kennedy mean to suggest 
that we should censure only the explicit attention to race in law 
enforcement, but excuse disparate and punitive impacts so long as 
they result from good intentions? In other contexts, he finds that 
disparity in sentencing is an important measure of racism.28 
CONCLUSION 
Race, Crime and the Law is a work of high legal scholarship and 
a cry for constitutional justice. But for me, Kennedy's key chapter 
is "Race, Law, and Suspicion" where he deplores a judicial trend 
that he says threatens to tum legally and morally wrong police con­
duct into something that is acceptable. As a matter of principle, I 
agree with Kennedy, but believe that he underestimates the capac­
ity of police to work around legal doctrine; especially where police 
are in the position of justifying their conduct in a procedural setting. 
More importantly, I have trouble reconciling Kennedy's powerful 
censure of the use of race in articulating suspicion of crime with his 
wishy-washy defense of the crack and powder cocaine distinction in 
Federal sentencing. In the real world of criminal law, of police, and 
of the courts, enforcement and sentencing policies around drugs 
loom far more significantly in the lives of young Hispanic and Afri­
can-American males than the doctrine Kennedy properly criticizes. 
Kennedy might well argue that the disparity of punishment for 
rape, for example, is clearly footprinted in a history of racism, while 
the crack-powder sentencing disparity was not grounded in racial 
motives. That may be true. But in a society with a history of slav­
ery and racial discrimination and with disproportionate criminality 
according to race and color that is likely traceable to that history, 
can we ignore disparate racial impacts when we are considering 
fairness? Perhaps someday, when equality is more of a reality. 
But, at present, race remains such a conspicuous factor in crime and 
crime policy that we cannot fail to notice sharp differences in the 
28. In a Vrrginia case discussed by Kennedy, Hampton v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 288 
(Va. 1950), the defendant's attorneys showed that between 1908 and 1949, 45 black men, but 
not a single white man, had been put to death for rape. P. 312. In Coker v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court prohibited imposing the death penalty for rape on grounds that the punish­
ment was disproportionate to the crime. The death penalty, it held, is so "excessive" for rape 
that it violates the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition. 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Kennedy notes, however, that racial disparity in rape 
sentencing still exists in many places, strongly suggesting that disparity is an important mea­
sure of racism. Pp. 72-74. 
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fate of blacks and whites. As we approach the millennium, the 
color line of punishment - especially in the war on drugs - is all 
too evident. 
